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TATSURO FUJIKURA

DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE RoLE oF CoLLECTIVE IMAGINATION IN THE MAOIST
CoNFLICT IN NEPAL
This paper argues that to understand the Maoist mobilization in Nepal, it is necessary to
probe the manner in which the proj ec t of national development has helped engender new
form s of collective imagination for the people, including th e Maoists. l first review th e political history of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and a variety approaches to analy zing the tvlaoist People's 'vVar. l argue that, in addition to macro-political economic analys es
and inquiries into local hi s tories of domination and res istance, we ne ed to explore th e forms
of collective imagination that impelled certain form s of ac tion- in thi s case, participation in
an arm ed movement with the aim of overtaking the state power. Based on textual and eth nographi c sources, l show that the proj ects of development in Nepal in th e past fiv e decad es ,
including such a major und ertaking as the creation of a national education system, provided c rucial conceptual and institutional conditions for the current Maoi st mobili zation.
Keyword s : ~1laoist s , development, youth , revolution , Nepal

This paper calls for an ethnographic approach to
the analysis of the Maoist People's 'vVar in Nepal. In
particular, it is an argument that to understand the
Maoist mobilization, it is necessary to probe the manner in which the project of national development has
helped engender new forms of collective imagination
for the people of Nepal, including the Maoists. There
are already a growing number of studies about the
Maoist conflict. Some of these analyze the evolution
of the ideology and the strategies of the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) as well as the macro-economic and social factors that have contributed to
the emergence of violent conflict. Other studies take
more ethnographic approaches to the issue. These
emphasize the long term continuity of local histories
of exploitation and resistance, and provide us with a
perspective from which to view the current conflict
as another instance in a long series of peasant rebellions. The approach that I propose here , however,
is different from both the political and the ethnohistorical approaches that I have just described. My
aim is not to refute either economic problems or local
conflicts as important factors in the current mobilization. I believe they are. What I seek to do, however, ·
is to add another, and I think crucial, dimension
concerning the role of imagination in shaping forms
of desire and action. In particular, I argue that we fail
to understand the historical specificity of the Maoist
mobilization , if we do not explore the ways in which
modern discursive forms-particularly, discourses
of national development and of revolution-have

THE

helped shape the imaginations, and thereby the actions, of the participants of the movement.
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE MAOIST PEOPLE'S
WAR

Since the early years of the People's War, journalists and public intellectuals in Nepal have provided
invaluable insights into the nature of the conflict
(Cf. Shrestha 2053 v.s.; Gyawali 1997; Mainali 2055
v.s.; Sharma 2057 v.s.; Dixit 2002). Deepak Thapa,
a leading journalist, begins one of his articles on
the subject with a review of the history of the Nepali communist party and its many fractures (Thapa
2002; Cf. Thapa 2001) . Thapa traces the history of
the communist movement in Nepal to the founding of the Communist Party of Nepal in Calcutta
in 1949. The story moves forward to the time King
Mahendra seized state power in 1960 and installed
the Panchayat system, the system of 'basic democracy' he claimed was best suited to Nepali soil. Even
though the King banned political parties, the 'Russian Communists' decided to participate in his government, while the 'Chinese Communists' kept their
distance. Many communist leaders who opposed the
King were jailed or went into exile as a result. But in
1974, the more radical members of the communist
movement succeeded in establishing a new party,
the Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth Congress),
which asserted as one of its primary demands that
elections be held to
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POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE MAOIST PEOPLE'S WAR

claimed was best suited to Nepali soil. Even though the King
banned political parties, the 'Russian Communists' decided
to .participate in his government, while the 'Chinese Communists' kept their distance . Many communist leaders who
opposed the King vve re jailed or went into exile as a result.
But in 1974, the more radical members of the communist
movement succeeded in establishing a new party, the Communist Party of Nepal (Fourth Congress), which asserted as
one of its primary demands that elections be held to constitute an assembly
to prepare a new constitution for the
country. In addition, this party worked
to become a popular movement, which
vvas to be turned into an armed struggle at the opportune moment. There
were further splits within this radical
faction in the following years. But after the restoration of the multi-party
parliamentary system in 1990, some
of the splinter groups joined together
and took part in the general election
under the name , United People's Front
(UPF). The UPF goal was to win in the
election so as to hasten the end of the
parliamentary system 'from within.'
After the election , the UPF emerged as
the third largest force in parliament 2
Yet a further split divided the UPF in
PHOTO: TATSURO FUJIKURA
tWO, With One half taking part in the
mid-term election of 1994, and the
other boycotting it. The faction that boycotted the election
became the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in 1995, and
in the same year developed the strategy for a people's war designed to encircle the city from the countryside. This 'People's
War' began on February 13, 1996, when the CPN (Maoist)
simultaneously attacked police posts, Agricultural Development Banks, and Small Farmers Development Project offices
in the Sindhuli , Rolpa, Rukum, and Gorkha Districts (Thapa
2002: 77-82; INSEC 1999 : 123-126) 3

Since the early years of the People's War, journalists and
public intellectuals in Nepal have provided invaluable insights into the nature of the conflict (Cf. Shrestha 2053 v.s.;
Gyawali 1997; :tvlainali 2055 v.s.; Sharma 2057 v.s.; Dixit
2002). Deepak Thapa, a leading journalist, begins one of his
articles on the subj ect with a review of the histm~y of the Nepali communist party and its many fractures (Thapa 2002;
Cf. Thapa 2001). Thapa traces the history of the com munist
movement in Nepal to the founding of the Communi st Party
of Nepal in Calcutta in 1949. The story moves forward to the
time King Mahendra seized state po\ver in 1960 and installed
the Panchayat system, the system of 'basic d emocracy' he

Thus, in Th apa's article, the Maoist People's War is seen
to emerge out of ideologica l and practical struggles within
the Communist Party itself. The ideological struggles identified include debates about whether the revolution should
be brought about through a popular movement or through
armed struggle, or whether the parliamentary system should
be used or boycotted. The practical struggles singled out include contingent events, such as the failure of one faction of
the UPF to receive the appropriate election sy mbol from the
election commission, which resulted in their being effectively
blocked from participating in the mid-term elect ion of 1994
and ultimately drifting further away from main stream parliamentary politics.

Th is pape r ca ll s for an eth nographic approach to the ana lysi of the Mao ist Peo ple's War in Nepa l. ln particular, it is
an argum ent that to understand the Maoist mobilization,
it is necessa ry to probe the manner in which the project of
nat iona l development has helped engender new forms of collect ive imagination for the people of Nepal, including the
Maoists. There are already a growing number of studies about
-the Maoist conflict. Some of these analyze the evolution of the
ideology and the strategies of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) as well
as the macro-economic and social factors that have contributed to the emergence of violent conflict. Other studies
take more ethnographic approaches to
the issue. These emphasize the long
term continuity of local histories of
exploitation and resistance, and provide us with a perspective from which
to view the current conflict as another
instance in a long series of peasant rebellions. The approach that I propose
here , however, is different from both
the political and the ethno-historical
approaches that I have just described.
My aim is not to refute either economic
problems or local conflicts as important factors in the current mobilization. I believe they are. What I seek to
do, however, is to add another, and I
think crucial, dimension concerning
the role of imagination in shaping forms of desire and action.
In particular, I argue that we fail to understand the historical
specificity of the Maoist mobilization , if we do not explore
the ways in which modern discursive forms-particularly,
discourses of national development and of revolution-have
helped shape the imaginations, and thereby the actions, of
the participants of the movement.
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Among the practical struggles and contingent events critically important to this discussion are the violent tactics ·u sed
by competing political parties against each other after the restoration of multiparty democracy system (Thapa 2002: 82-85;
Cf. Thapa 2001: 8-10). Use of violence among rival parties
was often reciprocal, but after one of the parties won control of the government, competition became radically asymmetrical , as the ruling party could and did employ police and
other state machinery against its rivals. Indeed, Thapa quotes
Amik Sherchan, a leader of the United People's Front as saying "If it hadn't been for Girija Prasad Koirala and Khum
Bahadur Khadka, there would perhaps have been no Maoist
war" (Thapa 2002: 84). Koirala is a senior leader of the Nepali Congress Party who served four times as Prime Minister
of Nepal between 1991 and 2001. Khum Bahadur Khadka,
serving as Home Minister in a Congress government in 1995,
directed suppressive operations (code-named 'Operation Romeo') against opposition political party activists in the Rolpa
District. The Human Rights Year Book 1995 describes the
operations in the following manner:
The government initiated ... suppressive operations to a degree of state terror. Especially, the workers of United People's
Front were brutally suppressed. Under the direct leadership
of ruling party workers of the locality, police searched, tortured and arrested, without arrest warrants, in eleven villages
of the district. Nearly 6,000 locals had left the villagers [sic]
clue to the police operation. One hundred and thirty people
were arrested without serving any warrants. Among the arrested included elderly people above 75 years of age. All the
detained were subjected to torture. Seven innocent women
were forcibly undressed and tortured pouring water and simultaneously beating in genitals by nettle (INSEC 1996: 12).
In addition to presenting a history of political parties, Thapa and other commentators (e.g. Sharma 2057 v.s.; Gyawali
2002; Mikesell1993, 2001; Maina li 2055 v.s) also discuss the
more general political, economic, and social circumstances in
Nepal. They write about the absence of substantive democracy, about the prevalence of poverty and unemployment ,
about the significance of the urban-rural divide, and about
the importance of ethnic and caste discrimination. All are
seen as contributing factors to the Maoist mobilization. And
they generally end their analyses with an examination of various scenarios for the future, including their own prescriptive
statements about how the conflict should be resolved. For example, Thapa suggests sincere political dialogue rather than
military force as a solution (Thapa 2002: 94-98).
·
Although I find much about this manner of presentation
and analysis significant and indeed indispensable, I also agree
\~'ith the demand for a more ethnographic approach, one that
explores specific local experiences and mobilizations as integral part of thi s conflict (cf. Shneiderman, this volume). Such

an approach probes the specific local context: it investigates
loca l memories and motivations that are embedded in the
texture of the everyday life. Fundamentally (and following
the example of anthropologists concerned with con flict and
violence in other parts of the world), such an approach does
not regard the current conflict as simply imposed from 'above'
or 'outside' on an otherwise 'peaceful' rural life. It attempts
to discover how "the form and content of the extraordinary
is deeply embedded in the history of the everyday, while it
nevertheless also stands outside the everyday" (Pracleep jagarnathan, as quoted in Menon and Bashin 1998: 60).
To understand the Maoist mobilization, therefore, we must
explore the "quiet prehistory" of violent conflicts (Scott 1992:
63) in Nepal. Such an exploration will reveal, I trust, that the
current Maoist mobilization is to a large degree , a matter of
continuity: that violence, and even violent deaths , have long
been a part of rural life. But, it will also reveal dimensions of
rupture: that in the collective consciousness of the participants, when a Maoist dies in this conflict, s/he is seen as a
martyr for the causes of the nation and the revolution-that
is, for imagined communities beyond the horizons of village
and the local relations of exploitation. Thus, I would like to
shift the emphasis in jagarnathan's formulation and suggest
that we need to explore how the extraordinary, even while it
is embedded in the everyday, nevertheless "stands outside the
everyday" and remains, indeed, extraordinary.
One of the most obvious reasons to acknowledge the fact
of rupture is because, from the point of view of the Maoists,
their movement is revolutionary movement. Their vision and
intent is to bring about fundamental change, a radical break
in the continuity of history: they want to destroy the old system , and institute a new one. Another reason to acknowledge
that the current mobilization is extraordinary involves its
excessive violence, an excessiveness that, I would suggest, is
partly connected to the mobilization's revolutionary vision.
Finally, we must acknowledge that the current mobilization is
extraordinary because it grows out of a rupture that preceded
it by several decades. This is the rupture of modernity, which
was brought into rural Nepal in large part through various
development interventions beginning in the 1950s. I want to
explore this last point in the next section.
PROJECT OF DEVELOPMENT AND THE 'YOUTH'

I lived in Salyan District in the mid-western hills of Nepal
between 1997 and 1999. Although 1 have returned there a
couple of times for brief visits, most of what 1 write here are
based on my observation up to 1999. The conflict has expanded especially since 26 November 2001, when the Maoists attacked the Royal Nepalese Army and the government
was forced to declare a state of emergency 4 The conflict has
spread throughout the country, and foreign governments
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including the United States are nm.v more actively involved.
Hence, it is important to emphasize that what I write below
refers mainly to an earlier phase of the conflict. In this earlier
phase, most of the people I knevv well in Salyan were highly
ambivalent about the NCP (Maoist)'s People's War. They did
not support the Maoists, but they did not support the government either. Instead, they felt "caught in between," as judy
Pettigrew has described (Pettigrew, this volume). Yet, at least
in the area in Salyan where !lived, people were still able most
of the time to keep both the Maoist and government forces at
arm's length and maintain the position of neutrality. Yet, with
the escalation of the conflict, there are many signs that the
space of neutrality is being eroded, as ever more people are
"caught in between" and tortured or killed by either Maoist
and government forces (Cf. Pettigrew, this volume). A large
number of people have had to
leave their villages to take refuge
elsewhere in Nepal or abroad.
journalists and human rights
activists are continuing their efforts of documenting the crimes
perpetrated by both sides. 5 Here,
however, in discussing the relationship between development
interventions and the contemporary crisis, 1 will focus on the
earlier phase of the conflict, and
on those villagers who supported
the Maoist movement.

Commenting on such an argument, a Maoist in Sa lyan sa id:
"If unemployment was the reason, iL would have made us not
Maobadis (lviaoists), but jagiri-badis (Employment-ists)." I
interpret her meaning to be that the movement was not simply a mechanical response Lo an economic problem, or an
expression of frustration in the face of individual deprivation.
The act of joining the movement was not simply a reaction to
personal grievances in the past or present, but rather a commitment, pledge, and dedication to bring about a particular
form of a collective future .
A closer look at the problem of education might clarify
matters. Stephen Mikesell's 1993 article on the possibility of
a Maoist 'people's war' in Nepal contained a concise, and I
think very accurate, statement of the problems of the national
education system in Nepal. He wrote :

Nepali education simultaneously prepares the students for
bureaucratic and managerial
jobs and disqualifies most of
them from these jobs. . . . It is
... an imposition onto the village communities of an alien
system of knowledge, pri oriti es,
values and methods evolved
from \Vestern colleges of education. Classroom discipline ,
examinations and certification
authoritatively determine what
is "true knowledge," and deAt least since the early 1990s,
value the knowledge, practices
analysts have linked Maoist moand languages of the villagers.
bilization to the problems of dePHOTO: TATSURO FUJIKURA
... An immense class of people
velopment, or more specifically, Bonded laborers from western Nepal marching to demand their
is
presently being schooled in
to the problems caused by 'failed freedom .
Nepal to despise their own rudevelopment.' These analysts
ral background (lvlikesell1993: 32) .
suggest that Nepal's failure to develop as a nation-state is the
I fully agree with Mikesell's observation that national edumain cause for the rise of the Maoist movement. They argue
cation
has been alien and alienating. But , I would also argue
that the officials who are responsible for running the Nepali
that
we
need to explore how this alienating education may
state have failed to provide the means for individuals and the
have
nonetheless
helped foster distinctive visions, aspiranation as a whole to move in an improving direction. Maoism,
tions,
dispositions,
and capacities in village youth. One of the
they believe, is a symptom of inadequate management and
explicit
intentions
of
the Nepali education system was to foscoordination, of a lack of the 'good governance' that vvould
ter
in
youth
an
attachment
to the Nepali nation. The history
have enabled Nepal and its people to mature.
textbooks spoke of the brave Nepalis who unified the nation
An example of this position is an oft-repeated claim that
and heroically defended it against the British (O nta 1996). In
the lack of employment opportunities for a "growing body of
fact, the textbooks were framed as exhortations of youth to
semi-educated youth" (Nickson 1992: 383) in rural areas was
become
the kinds of people who were able to lead the nation
a main cause for the rise of Maoist movement 6 Schooling, so
in its path towards progress (Ahearn 2001) In other words,
the argument goes, has raised the expectations of youth by
a major purpose of education was to enlist the youth into the
making them aware of the possibilities of a better life . Yet, the
state-sponsored project of collectively imagining a developstate has failed to provide these youth with jobs that would
ing nation. I argue that Maoist discourse built on the themes
have enabled them to achieve that better life.
developed by the nationalist education system but rearranged
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the themes in order to produce an alternative vision. Although
the national development discourse and the lvlaoist discoi.trse
are indeed different, since the latter built on the former, the
latter makes se nse to many of the rural yo uth because of th eir
prior ed ucation in the form er. Let me elaborate on this funher
by way of discussing my observations from Sa lyan.
Among the people who joined the Maoist movement in
Sa lyan, many did indeed h ave around ten years of form al
education. According to the stories that l heard , however,
schooling was not something that was 'imposed' by the state.
Local resources were mobilized and, during the 1960's and
'70's, loca l p eople, many of whom were P,t[aga rs or Matwali
Chetris 7 , took th e initiative in establi shing schools in their
own villages. ln the beginning only boys went to school. But
many local leaders in sisted that girls should be sent to school
too. One story has it that , in the 1970's, a Pradhan Panch ('v illage chairman') sent his daughter to school, but soon realized
th at she felt quite uncomfortable b eing the only girl there. So,
he imposed a fine on each household which did not send its
daughters to school. In some villages, girls who finished tenth
grade and passed the SLC 8 exams vvere immediately given
teaching position s in local schools so as to prove to the village
people , by way of concrete example, that there were benefits
to sending daughters to school.
For many of these women, going to school was more than a
means of achieving some purely personal or private goal. This
was so b ecause these women, as I have sa id , were exa mples.
They were exa mple s to other girl s, and they were examples to
the entire village and beyond. And, being an example meant ,
first of all, being for others, being beyond the self. I underline
this point , first of all, to argue against the kinds of analyses
th at reduce the problem of motive to a matter of personal interest. However, I should also note that , for th e past several
decades in Nepal, th e proj ect of national development aggressively promoted a view that it was necessa ry to have a formal
education in order to become a kind of person who could help
others (Gautam 2051 v.s.), and that , as an educated person ,
the primary way to help others was through helping to develop the nation (Skinner and Holland 1996).
As I have mentioned above, the :tvlaoists critici ze statesponsored nationalism . Yet , they share a basic assumption
with the official nationalism in that they too posit a 'Nepali
nation' as a taken-for-granted object of attachment and the
ground for all political action . A Maoist 'revolutionary song'
entitled "The Revolutionaries ," begins with the following
words: "Revolutionaries, liberate Nepal! I Come, the people
are calling I Come out at once, come out I Come out, ca rr ying guns" (Gautam 2055 v.s.: 3; my tran slation). As we can
see, the object to be liberated by the Maoi st revolutionaries is
'Nepal'. Another song, entitled "\Vake up and rise, Oh Youth ,"
begins as follows:

Wake up and rise, oh youtb, carrying torches
Growing brave like Hi mal , turning into a wall of rock
Today on our upper arms depends the fortun e of the nation
Today in our heartbeats is th e love for the nat ion
If we are timid now the nation will sink
If we are conscious now the nation will be bu ilt
Wake up and rise, oh youth, carrying sickles
Becoming stars equipped with hammers
(Gautam 2055 v.s.: 13 ; my translation)
This revolutionary song exhorts the youth , just as the
school textbooks do , to become conscious and active builders
of the n ation, although unlike the textbooks, the song calls
for armed struggle as a means of nation-building.
The statement issued by the Nepal Com munist Party (Maoist) on the day it launched the People's War, indeed, began
with a criticism of the Nepali state for failing to develop the
nation: "The current rulers of Nepal, speaking tirelessly about
[in fact]
development and nation-building for 50 years
have led Nepal to become one of the world 's poorest nation s,
second only to Ethiopia" (Quoted in Nepa l Rastriya Budwijivi
Sanga th an 2054 v.s.: 45; my tran slation). The Maoists declare
that it is no\v time to overthrow the "comprador and bureaucratic capitalist classes" (ibid.) which have ruled Nepal and
led it into its current economic, political and cultural crisis.
Thus, the Maoists' declaration of war attempts to de-legitimatize the current regime by pointing out its failure to develop
Nepal, and attempts to present its members as the legitimate
rulers, the true representatives of the people and the real
agents of development.
Another story from Salyan will help make my case about
the relationship between development andlvlaoist discourses.
The 1vlaoists' concrete programs for social change included
a campaign to ban alcohol , or 'raksi bandh'. In the area of
Salyan where I lived , the raksi bandh ca mpaign encouraged
by the Maoists began around 1998. Both Maoists and nonlvlaoist women- including those women who were otherwise
strongly opposed to th e Maoists' violent tactics- participated
actively in this campaign. Raksi-bandh committees con sisting exclusively of women were form ed in many vill ages
and neighborhoods to impose fines on those making and/or
consuming alcohol. In some neighborhoods, simply asking
where one could obtain alcohol was a crime puni sh able by a
fin e of 50 rupees . \i\lhen men in a village commented that the
women were involved in raksi-bandh committees simply because they were told to do so by members of the UPF, all the
women present objected . They countered that they wanted to
ban alcohol, not because any Party told them to do so, but for
their own sakes. It was, they said, 'the women' who wanted
to ban alcohol. They were the ones who bore the economic
consequences of the over-consumption of alcohol and suffer
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the harassment and violence from drunken men. It was 'the
women' who wanted the reform so as to improve the villages
that have been plagued by alcohol.

and also in the manner in which they learned such ex tracurricular skills as dancing. Even if they were not lvlaoists, a
blacksmith abused by his patron or a student's parent upset
about a teacher who did not show up in school could say:
"What would the Maoists do if they heard about this7" ln
many areas, the Maoists appeared to be involved in 'making
things right' - making things work the way they were supposed to ·work within a modern, developmentalist Nepali nation-state. The threat of violence produced their remarkable
effectiveness.

Interestingly, at the same time as the Maoist- encouraged
raksi-bandh campaigns were being carried out in the villages, there also was an anti-alcohol campaign funded by the
Asia Foundation going on around Salyan's bazaar area. The
Asia Foundation is a California based non-profit organization which described its
objectives in a pamphlet
distributed in Kathmandu
SOCIAL CHANGE AND
in the late 1990s, as the
THE
'NECESSITY OF
'promotion of democracy
VIOLENCE'
and a market-oriented
economy'. According to the
This leads us to the probAsia Foundation's program
lem of violence. After the
officer, their anti-alcohol
initiation of the People's
campaign emerged out of
\Nar, many commentators
their women's empowerexpressed shock at the fact
ment program. The Asia
that Nepal - the 'zone of
Foundation had provided
peace', the birth place of
funding for organizing
Lord Buddha, populated
'women's groups' around
by a friendly and peacethe bazaar and encouraged
loving people - could so
them to make a list of the
quickly plunge into a state
problems in their comof civil war (Cf. Panday
munities that they wanted
1999: 10-12). The Maoists
PHOTO: BACKWARD SOCIETY EDUCATION (BASE), 2000
to solve. The problem of
however offered a different
drinking emerged at the Freed bonded laborers camping near an administrative building in Bardiya.
interpretation of the nature
top of the list . Accordingly,
and history of the Nepalis.
the Asia Foundation provided further funding for women to
Their document entitled "Strategy and Tactics of Armed
organize a rally in the bazaar against drinking. As far as I
Struggle in Nepal," adopted by the Third Plenum of the
could tell, nothing changed after the rally until, a few months
Central Committee of the CPN (Maoist) in 1995, contained
later, Maoists appeared at a bazaar shop one night with petrol
the follovving assertions:
bombs. They told the shop owner to stop selling alcohol, and
l. The reactionary propaganda that the Nepalese people
destroyed all of the liquor he had in stock. Sales of alcohol
are peace-loving and that they don't like violence is absolutely
in the bazaar stopped (at least in public) the very next day.
false. It is an incontrovertible fact that the Nepalese people
This episode was interpreted by many living in the area as an
have been waging violent struggle for their rights since the
example of the Maoists' determination and ability to produce
historical times.
real changes in society, in contrast to that of other political
2. Till today vvhatever general reforms have been achieved
parties or development-aid organizations. It was also clear to
by
the Nepalese people, behind them there was the force of
all that the effectiveness of the Maoists derived in large part
violent
and illegal struggle of the people.
from their use of force .
There were many other causes that the Maoists advocated
and initiated, during the early years of the Maoist war (ca.
1996-99) that many non-Maoists approved of. There was
in general less government corruption and usury where the
Maoists were strong. Dalits 9 had less fear of being beaten-up
by members of higher castes. Public servants were compelled
to go to their offices and actually do their work. There was
more discipline in Maoist-dominated schools. Discipline was
evident both in the way students studied in their classrooms
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The document goes on to argue that "Today, the greatest
responsibility has fallen upon the revolutionaries to initiate
armed struggle against feudalism & imperialism and complete the New Democratic revolution by representing that
great historical legacy [of the violent struggles by the Nepali
people]" (CPN [J:vlaoist]: 1995). Hence, the Maoists challenged
the image of peace-loving Nepalis with a narrative of a violent
history which asserted the Nepali capacity for, and necessity
to, engage in violent struggle for social transformation.
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Here, it is important to observe that this document does
not repudi ate the official Nepali history in its entirety. While
iL refutes peace and harmony as the central ch aracteristics
of Nepa li soc iety, it affirms and utilizes another motif in the
offic ial history, namely that of 'Nepali braveness' (C f. O nta
1996). Hence, it claims th at the Nepali people are fervent nationali sts who "feel proud to lay clown their lives while fi ghting t'ather than submit to the pressures of the foreigners" and
"a re the great warriors in the world " (CPN [Maoist]: 1995).
Therefore, the Maoist discourse, rather than simply replacing
the official discourse, builds on and rearranges the themes
developed by the latter, including those of nationalism and
progress. The key ideological task in this rearrangement is
to construct a n arrative that conveys the absolute necessity
of revolution ary violence to achieving the progress that the
Nepali State promised but never delivered .
In Salyan District, Maoists not only used violence, but often after committing a violent act advertised it in newspap ers
and newsletters as well as during cultural programs, where
they skillfully re-enacted the torture and murder of a 'class
enemy'. For instance, after one such murder of a 'class enemy'
in early 1997, the Maoists summoned the local people to a
cultural program in ·w hich they re-enacted how they dragged
him outside of hi s house and cut-off his limbs, little by little.
They repeated this program in several different villages. The
purpose of these 'propaganda activities', I believe, was to convince the villagers of the necessity and efficacy of revolutionary violence. 'vVhat the Maoists aimed to convey was it was
only Maoist violence that could eliminate the local 'exploiter'
whose power derived in part from his close connection with
state power. Through such skillful re-enactments, the Maoists
undoubtedly aimed to communicate that they were capable of
extreme and hence awe-inspiring violence - ca lculated use of
brutality that they hoped made them appear more formid able
and effective than their enemy (the Nepali-state) or other selfproclaimed agents of social change (such as NGOs). 10
The follow ing episode concerning the Dasain 11 festival
contains an example of the kind of narrative constr uction
which attempted to produce a vi sion of a radical antagonism
between the Nepali state and the Nepali people that necessitated revolutionary violence. During the Dasain season , I
was listening to Radio Nepal with a couple of Maoist party
workers. A Radio Nepal announcer was explaining the traditions involved in Dasain, repeatedly stating that Dasain as a
whole vvas a celebration of the victory of 'Truth ' over darkness
and evil. We were li stening quietly. At the very end of the
program , in his last sentence, the annou ncer explained that
Dasain was traditionally celebrated to commemorate Gocl·cless Durga's triumph over Demons. The Maoist workers took
a deep breath and said , "Truth over Evil." To the Maoist listeners, thus, what the Radio Nepal announcer repeatedly referred to as a celebration of the triumph of truth over evil was

really a celebration of the subjugation of the non-Hindus by
the Hindu Nepali state. They viewed the Demons referred to
in the epic story as th e rea l people of Nepa l, and the Goddess
as an incarn ation of th e monstrous rulers of Nepal. The Maoist ve rsion of Dasain was constructed as a secret (and hence
true) history hidden behi nd the official pronouncements by
the Nepali state. The secret history revealed the deceptive and
monstrous n ature of the Nepali state, and prodded the Nepali
people to wa ke up and fight against its monstrousness.
The secret history of Dasain just described is in fact a version of counter-narratives told by ethnic-activists in many
corners of Nepal (Cf. Hangen 2001). On many occasions, I
listened to articulate Magars in Salyan engage in lengthy debates about whether Nepali society was essentially a 'caste-society' or 'class-society'. Magars committed to ethnic activism
would emphasize caste as the dominant structuring principle
of Nepali society. Others, including Magar Maoists, would
argue th at class was the ultimate determinant, while caste
ideology served the interests of the dominant class which
consisted mainly of high-caste Hindus. Again the crux of the
Maoists' ideological work was to construct a n arrative that
subsumed ethnic coun ter-narratives as well as other oppositional n arratives - including those of women , dalits, the poor,
the landless, and small farmers - and to present revolutionary
war as the only true remedy for all forms of oppression (C f.
Pahari 2003).
Maoist narratives constructed the current Nepali State
as a monstrous instrument of oppression in the hands of a
small mino rity of feudal and bureaucratic-capitalist classes .
Given such a monstrous state, Maoists argued , only violen ce
of spectacul ar proportion was sufficient to defeat it and to
set things right . And violence, they thought , was necessar y
'now'. While visiting Salyan during the 1999 parliamentary
election campaign, the leader of Com munist Party of Nepal
(J:vlarxist-Lenini st) , Bam Dev Gautam , said that his party was
in almost total agreement with the CPN (Maoist) except that
his members thought the situation not yet right for an armed
struggle. Loca l Maoists who hea rd these words commented
that , for people like Bam Dev, the 'right time' would never
come, and the future would be indefinitely postponed . The
Maoists, in contrast, were committed to making necessary
changes immediately (or at least within 5 years, as they used
to say around 1998). Becoming a Maoist, for them , entailed
abandoning the endless chain of calculation and analysis that
they saw as postponing radica l tran sformation. Their call was
for a leap into destructive/creative action .
The loca l Maoists' view I just described strikingly mirrors
what Prachanda, the General Secretary (at the time) 12 of the
CPN (Maoist), told the interviewer, Li Onesto, in the spring of
1999 : "The real process of development is breaking with continuation and m aking a rupture. Everything in n ature, in hu-
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man history and society ... is the process of breaking through
with continuation .... 'vVe condemn all the revisionist cliques
as vulgar evolutionarism. \Ve are revolutionary, and revolution mean s breaking with continuation and the question of
making leaps" (li Onesto 2000). Both the local Maoists and
Prachanda, then, embraced rupture .

for the current .tvlaoist mobilization.
lam not trying to claim that the 'lack' of development was
a cause of the Maoist war. Nor am l trying to establish that
' incomplete' or 'uncoordinated' development was responsible.
Rather l am urging that we attend to the radical transformation of the conceptual and institutional field that development
interventions created, a transformation that has reshaped the
field of political possibilities. The collective imagination of
the People's War has emerged and gained its force within this
field of reshaped possibilities. The Maoists have promoted a
vision in vvhich the armed revolution appears as an inevitable
step forward, given the monstrous Nepali state that was impeding true (and inevitable) progress.

There could be several ways of interpreting the concur. renee between Prachanda and the .tvlaoists in Salyan villages
concerning the necessity of rupture. The concurrence could
derive from the effectiveness of Maoist Party indoctrination,
reaching from its top to its 'bottom' in the villages. lt could
also be interpreted as a case of opportunism, with villagers
strategically 'adopting' the Maoist position because it served
their own pragmatic (and not necessarily revolutionary)
Understanding why their vision might appeal to some,
interests. l would like to propose an . - - - - -- - - - -- ----.............--_, or even to many Nepalis does not, of
alternative interpretation, one more in
course, mean that we have to agree
accordance with what the local 1vlaoist
with it . The task for those of us who do
cadre l quoted earlier meant when she
not agree with CPN (Maoist)'s violent
said Maobadis (Maoists) were not Jagiripolitics include, I would argue, exbadis (Employment-ists). The interpretaplorations of other forms of collective
tion l would propose is that Prachanda
imagination about social transformaand the local Maoists concurred because
tion that are non-violent but equally
they were participants in the same colcompelling and effective. 1 have in
lective imagination. Becoming a Maoist,
mind, for example, local organizations
at least for the local Maoist cadre 1 quotand networks that have mobilized for
ed and others like her, was not simply
the liberation of bonded agricultural
a means to pursue personal interests. lt
laborers, the 'Kamaiyas', in western Neentailed, rather, a commitment to , and
pal. Their mobilization, independent of
participation in, a particular - revoluany political parties, forced the Nepali
tionary - way of envisioning the world,
government to declare the 'emancipaa vision that propelled one toward a
tion' of tens of thousands of bonded
particular form of action . Key features
laborers and thereby introduced major
of that vision , as we have seen, included
ATSURO
IKURA ,
changes in class relations in the western
the absolute imperatives of progress and Bonded laborers during Kathmandu victory
plains. The movement is continuing,
improvement, necessity of a radical rap- rally after the declaration of emancipation by
as a large number of 'liberated' laborture with the past in order to bring about government.
ers are still demanding government to
authentic progress, a group of educated
provide them with land to live on and cultivate. As with the
'youth' as those privileged to bring about that change, and the
Maoists, we cannot understand this mobilization without
Nepali nation as both the object and ground for real develop reference to transformations brought forward in rural westment.13
ern Nepal through developmer.t interventions (See Fujikura
200la, 200lb). However, unlike the Maoists, those who moCONCLUSION
bilized for Kamaiya liberation did not aim to take over state
power and used methods that were decidedly non-violent.
In this paper, 1 argued that, in addition to macro-political
Rather than aiming at the violent purification of the nation,
economic analyses and inquiries into local histories of domithe movement demanded, and is still demanding, that the
nation and resistance, we need to explore the forms of colNepali state make good on its promises of development , of
lective imagination that impelled certain forms of action- in
upholding constitution, of basing its legitimacy on being able
this case, participation in an armed movement with the aim
to ensure the security and welfare of its citizens. At the same
of overtaking the state power. In historical terms, 1 showed
time, the movement's demands are based on universal printhat the project of development in Nepal , including such a
ciples- those of human rights- that are not contingent on the
major undertaking as the creation of a national education syspolicies of any particular state. Correspondingly, the network
tem, provided crucial conceptual and institutional conditions
that supports the movement crosses state boundaries. In con-
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trast to the l:Vlaoists' violent politics, we could characterize the
Kama iya movement as a "politics of patience ." Arjun Appadurai (2002) u se d this term to designate a form of socio-political
engagen1ent that values negotiation and coalition building,
one that acknowledges that positi ve social transformations
take long time to materiali ze . The politics of patience, Appadurai writes, is "co nstructed against th e tyranny of emergency"
- the em ergency experienced everyday by people suffering
from pove rty and exploitation (Appadurai 2002:30). Those
bonded laborers who struggled for their own liberation and
who, since the 'emancipation,' have endured without their
own land or housing, have NOT joined the Maoists, but have
been patiently working to make their society, the Nepali government , and international community live up to their own
promi ses, promi ses of civility and of equality. These laborers
provide a remarkable example of the politics of patience. And
they provide an alternative vision to those, on either side of
the current conflict, who see violence as its only solution.

HANGEN , SusAN. 2001. "We Must Dig Out the True History of This
Land": Narratives of the Past and Boycotts of the Dasain Festival in
Nepal. Paper presented at the 30th Annual Conference on South
Asia , Madison, WI, October 19-21, 2001.
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ENDNOTES
1

This is a revised version of the paper I presented at the "War on
Terrorism, 'vVar as Terrorism" Conference at Madison, Vvisconsin,
on October 10, 2002. Revisions were made in part in response to
general disc ussion and specific comments offered during the conference. Special thanks to Deborah Gewertz, Genevieve Lakier, and
john Metz for their helpful suggestions and criticisms through the
course of revisions.
2

The Nepali Congress won 110 seats, the Communist Party of
Nepal (United Marxist-Leninist) won 69, and the United People's
Front won 9.
3

In addition, members of the party also attacked a distillery in
Gorkha , and hurled a petrol bomb at the Pepsi-Cola factory in Kathmandu (Nepal Rastriya Buddhijibi Sangathan 2054 v.s.: 25-26).
4

According to INSEC's count, the number of people killed in
connection with the People's War between 13 February 1996 and 25
November 2001 was 1803 (993 killed by the government; 810 killed
by the Maoists). In contrast, the death toll between 26 November
2001 and 8 June 2002 was 3167 (2552 killed by the government,
615 killed by the Maoists) bringing the total death toll from the
conflict (by 8 june 2002) to 4970 (INSEC 2002). There are many
report s that suggest that the Maoists, in the frontline areas, have
intensified their coercive tactics forcing labor and forcing recruit-
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ment of villagers into their military force. As a consequence, many
villagers, es pec ially youth, have fled from their hom es into India or
elsewhere.
5

See, for example, the website maintained by Amnesty International 's Nepa l Section: hup://www.amnestynepal.org/ See, also,
Dixit 2002.
6

See Nickson (1992). His argument has been quoted approvingly
by Mainali (2055 v.s.) Sharma (2057 v.s.) and Thapa (2002)
7

Magars are considered an ethnic group, while lvlatwali Chetris
are considered a caste group. In terms of an encompassing caste
hierarchy, they are both located around the middle of the scale, below the 'sacred-thread-wearing' castes of Brahmans, Thakuris and
Tagadhari Chetris which have dominated the highest echelons of
social and political power.
8

This acronym refers to School Leaving Certificate exams, taken
after ten years of formal education. The passing of the SLC exams is
a minimum qualification for many government jobs.
9

'Dalits' here refer to those occupational caste groups who have
traditionally been considered 'untouchables'.
10

In the villages, rumors about the super-human natures of Jvlaoist fighters abounded. The rumors persisted even a fter many villagers had come in contact with actual Maoist cadres who looked
exactly like ordinary Nepalis. Most often, eye-witness accounts of a
given 'action' (an attack on a bank for example) would de scribe how
some of the Maoists were taller and bigger than any Nepali anyone
had ever seen.
11

A major festival and national holiday in autumn.

12

Prachanda was later named the Chairman of NCP (Maoist) at
its Second National Conference in February, 2001.
13

For a useful discussion of the often mutually contradictory
characteristics of the modern notion of emancipation, including the
demands for radical dichotomy, holism, transparency, rationality
and authenticity, see Laclau (1996).
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